Mercer Law Review
Volume 59
Number 3 Symposium: The Opportunity for
Legal Education

Article 7

5-2008

"Insane in the Membrane, Insane in the Brain":1 The Case of
Panetti v. Quarterman
Michael Eric Hooper

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Hooper, Michael Eric (2008) ""Insane in the Membrane, Insane in the Brain":1 The Case of Panetti v.
Quarterman," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 59 : No. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol59/iss3/7

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Casenote

"Insane in the Membrane, Insane in the
1 The Case of Panetti v. Quarterman
Brain":

I.

INTRODUCTION

Quarterman,2

In Panetti v.
the United States Supreme Court held
that the incompetence standard used by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was overly restrictive and failed to afford
proper Eighth Amendment 3 protection to a prisoner convicted of
murder.4 While Ford v. Wainwright5 established that a prisoner is
competent for execution if he or she knows of his or her impending
execution and the reason for it, the Court expanded the competency
standard in Panetti by holding that a prisoner's awareness of the
rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding
of its basis.6 Hence, a trial court should consider if the gross delusions

1. CYPRESS HILL, Insane in the Brain,on BLACK SUNDAY (Ruffhouse, Columbia Records
1993).
2. 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
4. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2860.
5. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
6. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862.
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of a death row inmate preclude the inmate's awareness of his execution.7

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: "PLENTY INSANE, GOT No BRAIN"8
Jane Panetti knew for some time that her husband, Scott Louis
Panetti, was not well. After becoming alarmed by Panetti's increasingly
abnormal behavior, she filed a petition seeking extraordinary relief from
the Texas state courts in May 1986. Her petition stated that Panetti
was experiencing hallucinations and suffering from extreme paranoia.
Panetti, convinced that the devil was in his family's home, gathered
many of the family's valuables and buried them in the backyard. He
would stay awake throughout the night and perform various cleansing
rituals, such as washing the furniture with water. Ultimately, Panetti's
obsession with Satan caused Jane to fear he would harm her and their
children.9
Although Jane divorced Panetti, her worst fears about her former
husband were realized by his second wife, Sonja. Tired of Panetti's
alcoholism and abusive behavior, Sonja obtained a protective order and
left Panetti in 1992. She took their three-year-old daughter and moved
into the home of her parents, Joe and Amanda Alvarado. Unfortunately,
her actions would prove futile. On the fateful morning of September 8,
1992, Panetti awoke before dawn, shaved his head, and dressed in
camouflage. After sawing off the barrel of his shotgun, he placed the
shotgun and a rifle into his vehicle and drove to the Alvarado home.
Panetti approached the house, busted the locked front door, and entered
the residence. He cornered Joe and Amanda Alvarado in the kitchen
and screamed at them. Despite his estranged wife's pleadings, he shot
both of her parents in the chest, killing them in front of his wife and
daughter. Panetti then took his wife and daughter as hostages and
returned to his home where he held them overnight. Finally, after
enduring a stand-off with the local police, Panetti released his captive
family and surrendered to the local authorities.10
After his surrender, Panetti was arrested and charged with capital
murder. Panetti sought to represent himself in the trial proceedings, but
the trial judge, Judge Stephen Ables, ordered a psychiatric evaluation
after questioning Panetti's competency. The evaluation indicated that

7. See id.
8. CYPRESS HILL, supra note 1.
9. Joint Appendix, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407), 2007
WL 609374, at *38-40.
10. Press Release, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, Supreme Court Punts Case of
Schizophrenic Murderer (June 28, 2007) (on file with author).
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Panetti suffered from a fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations." Although Panetti was treated previously in various Veterans
Administration hospitals for psychotic disorders, the evaluation revealed
that Panetti was competent to represent himself at trial. 2
At trial, Panetti pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. 13 Throughout the course of the trial proceedings, Panetti engaged in behavior that
his standby counsel regarded as bizarre. He dressed in a costume that
appeared to be from an old Western, including a cowboy hat, suede pants
tucked into cowboy boots, and a bandana. He asked strange questions
of his witnesses. When he testified about the shooting, he recalled the
details in a trance-like state. He described the shooting in the third
person, referring to "Sarge" as the perpetrator. He acted out Sarge's
shooting at the Alvarado home and referred to another person named
"Birdie." This behavior led his standby counsel to conclude that Panetti
was mentally incompetent. 4 Additionally, Panetti's decision to stop
taking his antipsychotic medicine only exacerbated his strange behavior
during the trial. Ultimately, the jury found Panetti guilty of capital
murder and sentenced him to death. 5
Although the court determined Panetti was competent to represent
himself during the trial, the State found Panetti incompetent to waive
habeas counsel after his sentencing. Consequently, the State appointed
habeas counsel to represent Panetti, and he appealed his conviction on
direct appeal and through state habeas proceedings. 6
The Texas state courts twice denied Panetti's request for relief on
direct appeal. 7 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court denied a
petition for certiorari on two separate occasions.'" After these denials,
Panetti filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 225419 in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas. The district court rejected Panetti's petition, and the
Fifth Circuit issued an order denying Panetti's petition on appeal.20
The United States Supreme Court denied Panetti's petition for certiorari

11. Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2848 (2007).
12. Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at *11, 14.
13. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849.
14. Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at *21-24, 26.
15. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Panetti v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 1052, 1052 (2003); Panetti v. Texas, 525 U.S. 848
(1998).
19.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).

20.

Panetti v. Cockrell, 73 Fed. App'x 78 (5th Cir. 2003).
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on December 1, 2003.21 Although Panetti raised issues regarding his
competency to stand trial and to waive counsel in this petition, he failed
to argue that insanity rendered him unfit for execution.22
While Panetti's petition for certiorari was pending before the Supreme
Court in 2003, Judge Ables set Panetti's execution date for February 5,
2004. Shortly after the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, Panetti's
counsel filed a motion under Article 46.05 of Vernon's Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure Annotated, 24 claiming that Panetti was incompetent for execution by reason of insanity. 25 Judge Ables denied Panetti's
motion without a hearing.26 Panetti appealed Judge Ables's decision
to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, but that court dismissed his
challenge on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction.
After exhausting his remedies in state court, Panetti then returned to
federal court and filed another writ of habeas corpus with the district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.28 However, unlike the previous
writ of habeas corpus he brought before the federal court, in this writ,
Panetti raised the issue of his competency for execution.29
During the evidentiary hearing, experts for both sides testified that
while Panetti did suffer from some form of mental illness, he also
retained his cognitive ability.30 The State's experts testified that while
Panetti's illness did not prevent him from understanding that he faced
execution, they were unable to assess the level of his comprehension for
the reason behind it. In contrast, Panetti's experts believed that Panetti
did not have a rational understanding of the reason for his execution. 1
Rather, they testified that Panetti suffered from the delusion that he
was being executed for "preaching the Gospel." 2 From Panetti's
perspective, his execution was another battle in his ongoing spiritual
war with Satan.3" Recognizing this new issue, the district court
ordered a sixty-day stay on February 4, 2004, to provide the state court

21. Panetti, 540 U.S. at 1052.
22. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849.
23. Id.
24. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05 (Vernon 2007).
25. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849.
26. Id.
27. Ex parte Panetti, No. 74868, 2004 WL 231461 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2004).
28. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849-50.
29. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Panetti v. Dretke, No. A04 CA 042 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 23, 2004), 2004 WL 5275657.
30. Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 707 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
31. Id. at 708.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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with reasonable time to consider the evidence of Panetti's mental
state. 4
Subsequently, the state court examined Panetti's renewed motion to
determine his competency for execution and ordered a telephone
conference between all parties on February 9, 2004. After consulting
with counsel during the phone conference, Judge Ables directed both
parties to submit the names of mental health experts for the court to
consider by February 20, 2004. Additionally, the court gave each party
until that same day to submit any motions related to the proceedings.
The phone conference ended after all parties agreed to participate in
another telephone conference on the deadline date.3 5
Following the initial phone conference, Panetti's counsel, Michael
Gross, filed ten motions related to the proceeding. Gross also prepared
for the scheduled phone conference, which unbeknownst to Gross, had
been cancelled. Gross called Judge Ables's office and was informed that
the judge was out of the office. Gross then contacted the district
attorney who explained that Judge Ables had cancelled the conference
call and would appoint the mental health experts without input from the
parties.36
Panetti received an order from the court on February 23, 2004, which
confirmed the district attorney's assertion. The order, which was dated
February 20, 2004, appointed two mental health experts. The court later
denied two of Panetti's motions in a telephone conference. Panetti filed
a motion to reconsider on March 4, 2004, but the court never responded
to the motion. 37
The court-appointed experts issued a report on April 28, 2004, that
concluded Panetti had the ability to know and understand he was about
to die. Even though the experts believed that Panetti was uncooperative
during the evaluation, they determined that he understood the reason
for his execution. After receiving the evaluation, Judge Ables found
Panetti competent for execution and notified Panetti's counsel in a letter.
Although Panetti filed another motion for an evidentiary hearing to

34. Id. at 712. The district court denied Panetti's first motion to stay the execution on
January 28, 2004, because of a failure to include both a copy of the Article 46.05 motion
from state court and evidence of Panetti's mental state. Subsequently, Panetti filed a
motion to reconsider on January 30 with a copy of the Article 46.05 motion. However, the
court denied this motion as well because of the lack of evidence regarding Panetti's mental
state. Finally, the court granted a stay on February 4 after Panetti's counsel filed a second
motion to reconsider with evidence of Panetti's mental state. Joint Appendix, supra note
9, at *12-13.
35. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2850.
36.

Id.

37. Id. at 2850-51.
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consider his expert's opinion, Judge Ables closed the case on May 26,
2004.38

After the state court closed Panetti's case, he again returned to the
federal district court seeking resolution of the previously filed habeas
petition.3 9 Although the court found the state's proceedings to be
constitutionally inadequate in light of Ford v. Wainwright,40 it denied
Panetti's application for habeas relief on the basis that he satisfied the
competency requirement as defined by circuit precedent.4 '
Following the district court's decision, Panetti appealed to the Fifth
Circuit. Panetti argued that the district court applied an erroneous
standard in evaluating his competency.42 Panetti contended that his
understanding of the execution was lacking because he believed that the
State was punishing him for "preaching the Gospel."43 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Panetti was competent
for execution based on his understanding of "the nature, pendency, and
purpose of his execution."4 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on
January 5, 2007, to consider whether the competency standard in Ford
requires a death-row prisoner to have a rational understanding of the
reasoning behind his or her execution.4 5

III.
A.

46
LEGAL BACKGROUND: "DON'T You KNow I'M LOCO?"

Origins of the ProhibitionAgainst Executing the Insane

Like many aspects of American criminal law, the prohibition against
executing the insane is likely a derivative of English common law. 47 As
early as the eighteenth century, Sir William Blackstone wrote that a
lunatic was excused from the guilt of his crime because of the "deficiency8
in will" that "arises ... from a defective or vitiated understanding."4
Moreover, this same protection extended to any man that committed a
capital offense but became "mad" at any time before his execution,

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
2007).

Id. at 2851.
Id.
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Panetti,401 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 816-17 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 818.
Id. at 819, 821 (emphasis omitted).
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2848; Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 852 (January 5,

46.

CYPRESS HILL, supra note 1.

47.

See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1769).

48.

Id. at 24.
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including arraignment, trial, pleading, and judgment.49 According to
Sir Blackstone, an insane criminal was spared from execution because
he was not competent to plead his case with the "advice and caution"
that was required.5 °
Similarly, Sir Edwardo Coke also noted the prohibition against
executing the insane. 1 However, Sir Coke believed that the prohibition
existed because the execution of a madman "can be no example to
others."5 2 This understanding is premised on the belief that the
execution of a lunatic provides little deterrence.53 Although Sir Coke
and Sir Blackstone disagreed about the reason behind the law, both
commentators recognized this restriction on executions.5 4
The common law basis for not executing the insane remained
unchallenged until Ford v. Wainwright55 in 1986. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment56 barred the execution
of an insane prisoner after the state of Florida deemed the prisoner
competent for execution despite his manifested severe paranoia. The
Court reached this decision with a four-justice plurality.5
Justice Powell, concurring with the plurality, also crafted his own
opinion.59 In his opinion, which is the controlling opinion according to
canons of judicial construction," ° he outlined the minimum standards
for competency.6 " According to Justice Powell, the Eighth Amendment
is not violated if a defendant knows of his or her impending execution
and understands the connection between his or her crime and the
punishment.62 In crafting this standard, Justice Powell rejected Sir

49.
50.
51.
(1797).
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
EDWARDO COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6
Id.
See id.
See id.; BLACKSTONE, supra note 47.

55. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
57. Ford,477 U.S. at 404, 419.
58. Id. at 401.
59. Id. at 418-31 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. In Marks v. United States, the Court stated: "When a fragmented court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."' 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
61. Ford, 477 U.S. at 427.
62. Id. at 422.
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Blackstone's reasoning.'
He reasoned that the many procedural
safeguards involved in recent death penalty cases rendered Sir
Blackstone's concerns obsolete.6 Instead, Justice Powell relied upon
Sir Coke's explanation and grounded his competency standard in the
deterrent nature of capital punishment.6 5
The competency standard outlined in Ford had legal implications
beyond the area of insanity. In Atkins v. Virginia,6 6 the Court relied
on the rationale in Ford when it examined the degree of mental
disability required for an Eighth Amendment prohibition against a
prisoner's execution." While the Court acknowledged that there was
little disagreement regarding the prohibition against executing the
mentally disabled, there was a lack of "national consensus" about the
prerequisite level of mental disability required to invoke Eighth
Amendment protection." Ultimately, the Court adopted the minimalist
approach from Ford and concluded that individual states are more apt
at adopting "appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon [their] execution of sentences. " 69
Ford provided a uniform competency standard, yet the standard's
criteria failed to translate into a coherent application among the many
circuit courts due to the imprecise nature of many mental illnesses and
the evolution of society's understanding of insanity.7" Frequently, lower
state and federal courts grappled with determining the boundaries of an
insane prisoner's "knowledge" of the causal connection between his or
her impending execution and his or her crime.71 Counsel for death row
prisoners, recognizing this
dissonance, continued to petition the Supreme
72
relief.
habeas
for
Court
Often, the Court denied certiorari to the petitioners as it did in Rector
v. Bryant.7 3 However, in that denial of certiorari, Justice Marshall
wrote an unusual dissenting opinion that captured many of the concerns
surrounding the Ford competency standard. 74 After disagreeing with

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
(W.D.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 422 n.3.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 421-22.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original)
See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702
Tex. 2004) (No. A04 CA 042), 2004 WL 52775657, at *10-15.
See id.
See id.
501 U.S. 1239 (1991).
Id. at 1239-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Justice Powell's rejection of Sir Blackstone's justification in Ford,Justice
Marshall argued it was unreasonable to assume that collateral review
in a particular case "has rooted out all trial errors," especially when the
defendant is insane and incapable of communicating facts to those
conducting the review process.75 Thus, "it is inhumane to put a man
to death when he has been rendered incapable of appealing to the mercy
According to Justice
of the society that has condemned him."76
Marshall, Ford did not settle this issue, and the mental acuities of many
death-row inmates continued to decline as they awaited execution."
Although Justice Marshall believed the death penalty was cruel and
unusual punishment in all circumstances, 8 his dissent served as a
premonition of challenges that would later unfold before the Supreme
Court.
AEDPA and Its Role in Changing the Habeas Petition Process

B.

While the lower courts continued to wrestle with the application of
Ford to death penalty cases, the consideration of habeas applications
became more complicated when Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
This lengthy
Effective Death Penalty Act of 199679 ("AEDPA").
congressional act, which was passed with broad support, amended many
of the federal laws involving criminal proceedings, including 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b). 80 AEDPA modified § 2244(b) by requiring federal courts to
dismiss any second or successive habeas corpus application that includes
a new claim not present in a prior application under § 2254.81 However, this requirement does not apply if the petitioner relies upon a new
rule of constitutional law or a factual predicate that the petitioner could
not have discovered before the prior habeas application. 2 Section 2244
also requires the dismissal of any subsequent claim that brings forth a
previously ruled-upon issue.83 Consequently, as a practical implication
of the statutory language of § 2244(b)(1)-(2), the federal courts were
precluded from hearing many second or successive habeas claims from
death-row inmates.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1243.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255, 2261-2266 (2000).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000).
Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B)(i).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
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Unfortunately, in crafting the gatekeeping mechanism of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b), Congress did not consider the evolving nature of many Ford
claims. 4 If the language of § 2244(b)(1) is applied strictly, then it bars
an inmate from submitting a second Ford claim when the court has
already ruled on the issue, even if his or her level of mental insanity
grows into a ripe claim after the submission of the first Ford claim.8"
Likewise, an inmate that becomes insane after filing an initial habeas
claim-not addressing insanity because it was not a ripe issue at the
time of filing-is also barred by § 2244(b)(2) from filing a subsequent
claim."6
Thus, Congress's effort to increase judicial efficiency by
enacting § 2244(b) presented a potential conflict with a prisoner's right
to due process.
In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,7 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of second or successive habeas applications by insane death-row
inmates."8 After the defendant, Martinez-Villareal, was convicted of
murder, he filed several claims in federal district court, including a claim
of insanity. The district court dismissed those claims because the
defendant had not yet exhausted state remedies. After exhausting his
appeal in the state court, the defendant filed another habeas petition
with the district court when the State obtained a warrant for his
execution. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear this
subsequent habeas claim under § 2244(b)(1) because it had already ruled
on his Ford claim in the prior petition. The defendant then appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit stayed the defendant's execution but later denied the defendant's
habeas petition."s The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve an
apparent circuit split on this issue.90
The Supreme Court's decision hinged on its interpretation of the
language "second or successive" in § 2244(b)(1). 91 According to the
Court, Martinez-Villareal's second petition was not barred by the

84. -A Ford claim, which takes its name from Ford v.Wainwright, is a habeas corpus
petition in which the petitioner alleges mental insanity. See 477 U.S. 399. An allegation
of mental insanity entitles the petitioner to an evidentiary hearing, and if the petitioner
is found to be legally insane, his or her execution is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
See id. at 410.
85. Id.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
87. 523 U.S. 637 (1998).
88. Id. at 639.
89. Id. at 640-41.
90. Id. at 641.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(2); Stewart, 523 U.S. at 644.
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gatekeeping provision of § 2244(b)(1).9 2 Even though the defendant
asked the district court to provide relief on a second occasion, this second
petition was not a separate application.9' Rather, it was a continuation
of his previous Ford claim, which was dismissed as unripe.94 The
district court should have ruled on the second petition because the claim
was finally ripe.95 In this nuanced holding, the Court challenged the
lower courts to balance the policy aspirations of AEDPA with the legal
considerations of due process afforded to prisoners awaiting execution.96
Unfortunately, the majority opinion failed to address whether a Ford
claim that appears for the first time in a second petition was barred by
§ 2244(b)(2) as a second or subsequent claim.
While AEDPA was arguably a poorly written law as applied to the
habeas petitions of insane prisoners, it was not solely responsible for the
confusion among legal practitioners. Indeed, the mandates of AEDPA
only muddled the already confused realm of Ford claims. The minimalist approach of Ford'scompetency standard failed to address many of the
complexities surrounding insanity. Prisoners, such as Scott Panetti,
remained trapped in those crevices where proper adjudication ran afoul
of both case law and statutory language. These issues remained
unresolved until the Supreme Court decided in Panetti.
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE: "IT'S BECAUSE I'M LOCO"

97

In Panetti v. Quarterman," the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the Eighth Amendment9 9 prohibits the execution of
a prisoner who knows of his or her execution and the State's reason
behind it yet manifests insane delusions about the reason for his or her
execution.'0 0 The Court concluded that gross delusions stemming from
a severe psychotic disorder can prevent a defendant from rationally
understanding the reason for his or her execution.' 1 Thus, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of a defendant in this circumstance. 102

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Stewart, 523 U.S. at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 643-45.
CYPRESS HILL, supra note 1.
127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2859.
Id. at 2862.
Id.
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The Majority Opinion: "GoingInsane, Got No Brain""3
In this case, Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote to the
majority with Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens joining his
opinion. 1 4 The majority addressed three main points in support of its
holding.'0 5 First, the Court had the statutory authority to consider
Panetti's claim because it was not barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).106 Second, the state courts failed to provide the proper procedural
due process as required by the Constitution. 10 7 Third, when the Fifth
Circuit analyzed Panetti's condition, it utilized an overly restrictive
application of the competency standard laid out in Ford v. Wainwright.0 8
The Court began its analysis with the consideration of jurisdiction. 10 9
The State argued that § 2244(b)(2) precluded the Court from considering
this habeas petition because Panetti failed to mention insanity in a prior
petition. The State recognized that many Ford claims are generally not
ripe until after a petitioner files his or her first writ of habeas corpus;
nevertheless, it maintained that a prisoner should mention insanity in
his or her first petition, regardless of the claim's ripeness. The federal
court could then revisit the claim when it became ripe. According to the
State, this suggested approach would best provide adjudication to a
defendant without compromising the procedural requirements of
§ 2244(b)(2)." °
The majority, however, rejected the State's suggested approach."'
The Court recognized that this counter-intuitive approach would require
all defense attorneys to file unripe habeas claims of insanity to protect
the future possibility of an insanity claim." 2 Because the appeals
process for a death-row defendant is quite lengthy, it is possible that a
defendant's sanity may deteriorate during this period." 3 Consequently, the State's approach would undermine the efficiency rationale behind
§ 2244(b)(2) by necessitating an unknown number of unripe claims."'
A.

103. CYPRESS HILL, supra note 1.
104. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2847.
105. Id. at 2848.
106. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000).
107. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2848.
108. Id.; 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
109. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2852.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2852-53.
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In prior cases, such as Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,"6 the Court
declined to interpret "second or successive" as referring to all § 2254
claims."' Although the Court in Stewart did not address the applicability of § 2244(b)(2), the Court in Panetti noted that the majority's
approach in that case illustrated the need to look at the intentions of
Congress when considering implications for habeas practice." 7
After examining the legislative history of AEDPA, the majority in
Panetti first held that Congress did not intend for AEDPA's provisions
to govern a habeas application that raises a Ford claim when it becomes
ripe." 8'
Second, requiring defendants to comply with the empty
formality of filing unripe habeas claims compromises the judicial
efficiency impetus behind AEDPA." 9 Third, even though waiving the
application of AEDPA to habeas claims of insanity may provide
defendants with the possibility of filing last-minute, frivolous claims,
Ford's preliminary threshold requirement precludes the possibility of
abuse. 20 Thus, the statutory bar on second or successive applications
does not
apply to a Ford claim when the claim is filed after becoming
12 1
ripe.
Following its disposal of the jurisdictional issue, the Court turned its
attention to the procedures of the lower state court. In a stinging
rebuke, the majority concluded that the State failed to provide Panetti
with the minimum due process requirements laid out in Ford. 22 In
reaching this determination, the Court cited several instances from the
record when the trial court failed to adhere to established procedures.
The trial court refused to transcribe proceedings, conveyed false
information to Panetti's counsel, ignored motions by Panetti, and failed
to provide Panetti with an adequate opportunity to submit expert
evidence in response to the court-appointed experts.123 According to
the Court, the most egregious denial of due process was the trial court's
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the testimony of Panetti's
experts. 124 Although Ford left the procedural particulars of competency findings to the state's discretion, the Court noted that the trial court

115. 523 U.S. 637 (1998).
116. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2853.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2854.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2855.
122. Id. at 2856.
123. Id. at 2856-57.
124. Id. at 2857.
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failed to adhere to the Texas requirement of a final competency
hearing. 2 ' This omission by the trial court resulted in a failure to
provide minimum due process and 126was inadequate for reasonably
resolving Panetti's competency claim.
Finally, the Court addressed the primary issue of whether the Eighth
Amendment allows the execution of a defendant when the defendant's
personality disorder deprives him or her of a rational understanding of
the reasons he or she is being executed. 2 After reviewing various
expert testimonies regarding the nature of schizophrenic disorders,
particularly the ability of these disorders to afflict a person without
diminishing cognitive ability, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit
12
applied a flawed interpretation of the Ford competency standard. 1
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's holding, a proper application of the Ford
competency standard does not preclude a defendant from showing that
his psychotic disorder obstructs a rational understanding of the State's
reason for his execution. 29 A prisoner's delusional beliefs are not
"irrelevant" to a finding of competency. 3 ° Rather, the minimalist
approach of Ford allows for consideration of these beliefs.' 3' By
ignoring Panetti's delusions, the Fifth Circuit prevented the death
penalty from fulfilling its deterrent purpose because Panetti lacked the
awareness necessary to understand the relationship between his
execution and its reason. 32
After distinguishing between a prisoner's awareness of his or her
execution and a rational understanding of it, the Court concluded that
Ford does not foreclose inquiry into the latter.'33 The majority recognized that the concept of rational understanding is difficult to define.'3 Many convicted prisoners awaiting execution are not "'normal'" or "'rational'" within the layperson's understanding of those
words. 3 ' However, the threshold of a competency inquiry is not based

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2859.
at 2860.
at 2861.

at 2862.
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amoral character."13 6
upon a prisoner's "misanthropic personality or an
13 7
Rather, it considers only a "psychotic disorder."
While this holding reversed the restrictive approach taken by the Fifth
Circuit, the Court specifically chose not to set down a more precise rule
governing all competency determinations; instead, it continued the
minimalist approach adopted in Ford.3 8 As to the merits of Panetti's
habeas claim, the Court declined to rule. 3 ' It noted that the district
court failed to include findings of fact in its opinion. 4 ' As a result of
this deficiency, the Court found it difficult to rule on such a complex
issue without allowing the lower courts to address the nature and
severity of Panetti's alleged mental problems.'
Hence, the Court
remanded the petition back to the lower courts for development of the
evidentiary record.'4 2
B. The Dissenting Opinion: "Next to the Chair,Got Me Goin' Like
143
General Electric"
Justice Thomas dissented from the majority and was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito.4
Justice Thomas's
dissent attacked all three points in the majority's holding. 45 First,
Justice Thomas argued that the Court lacked the statutory jurisdiction
to consider Panetti's claim. 146 Although Panetti presented a sympathetic figure, Justice Thomas opined that the majority ignored a clear
statutory mandate by allowing a second or successive habeas application. 41 According to Justice Thomas, "[t]he Court reache[d] a contrary
conclusion by reasoning that ... second or successive takes its full
meaning from our case law." 148 The judicial discretion used by the
majority in interpreting "second or successive" epitomizes the type of
judiciary "discretion" that Congress sought to eliminate with the passage
of AEDPA. 49 Justice Thomas also disagreed with the majority's

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2863.
Id. at 2862-63.
Id. at 2863.
Id.
CYPRESS HILL, supra note 1.
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2863 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2864-74.
Id. at 2864.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2865.
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reliance on Stewart to determine whether Congress intended to treat
habeas claims differently than other claims. 5 ° From his perspective,
Stewart allows for the continuation of a claim that later ripened, but it
does not "suggest[] that it is ...

appropriate ...

for a prisoner to wait

before seeking resolution of his incompetency claim."" 1 Instead,
Justice Thomas contended that the Court's holding in Burton v.
Stewart. 2 was analogous to the issues presented in Panetti's case.'53
In Burton the Court rejected a prisoner's second habeas petition even
though the challenge to his sentencing was not ripe at the time of his
first petition's filing.'54
Likewise, Justice Thomas asserted that
§ 2244(b)(2) applies to a prisoner's subsequent insanity claim, even if the
insanity claim was unripe at the time the first habeas petition was
filed. "55
' Thus, a Ford claim does not deserve a "special... exemption
56
from the statute's plain import.""
Moreover, Justice Thomas questioned the judicial economy considerations of the majority opinion.5 7 Like the State, Justice Thomas
believed all initial habeas petitions should include Ford claims.5 "
Even if this requirement caused the federal courts to experience an
influx of unripe habeas petitions, the district courts could handily
dismiss the unripe claims while simultaneously preserving the option for
defendants to raise the claims again after they ripened." 9 This
approach also has the advantage of providing6 0 notice to a state that a
prisoner intends to challenge his competency.
Second, after questioning the majority's rationale regarding the
statutory authority for the Court to rule in this case, Justice Thomas
then argued the State's procedures met the minimum due process as
required by the Constitution.' 6 ' Panetti only filed two exhibits in state
court with his renewed motion for competency determination, and these
exhibits simply outlined his mental history from 1981 to 1997.162

Because these exhibits were merely "preliminary observations" and
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158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 2865-66.
Id. at 2866 n.4 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 S. Ct. 793 (2007).
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2866 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Burton, 127 S. Ct. at 796.
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2866 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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failed to address Panetti's competency at the time of his scheduled
execution in 2004, Justice Thomas contended that Panetti's claim met
the preliminary threshold showing of insanity that is required by a Ford
claim.' 63 Even if Panetti met this threshold as the majority claimed,
Justice Thomas maintained that the State met minimum due process
requirements by considering Panetti's insanity claim.' 1 4 Texas required a competency hearing, not an evidentiary hearing.'65 Hence,
the state
court operated within the substantial leeway granted by
166
Ford.

Finally, Justice Thomas rejected the majority's holding that Ford
required any consideration of a prisoner's rational understanding of the
reasons for his execution. 1 7 Without discussing the merits of Panetti's
claims, Justice Thomas argued Ford never addressed rational understanding.'68 Because Ford only addressed actual knowledge, the
majority's assertion that the Fifth Circuit was overly restrictive was
inconsistent with Ford. 69 Instead, Justice Thomas concluded the
majority wrongly expanded the Eighth Amendment to require rational
understanding.'7
V.

IMPLICATIONS:

"LOOK, BUT DON'T MAKE YOUR EYES

7
STRAIN"' '

Panetti v. Quarterman72 maintained the minimalist approach
regarding competency standards from Ford. Although the Court could
have built upon the four-justice plurality of Ford,it declined to propose
a rule for determining competency.'7 3 The indefinite nature of many
psychotic disorders likely will continue to test Ford's requirement that
a prisoner have knowledge of the reason for his execution. Thus, the
Court's failure to lay down a rule in this case, referred to as the Panetti
"Punt" by critics, only sullied the already murky waters of habeas
petitions. 174 Confusion is likely to continue to abound regarding the
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application of a competency standard for death-row prisoners suffering
from psychotic disorders.
The Court also failed to examine the relationship between personality
disorders and criminal culpability. For example, when does mental
illness that is not on the level of a schizophrenic psychotic disorder
mitigate culpability? While the Court recognized the deterrent purpose
of punishment is not served when a prisoner fails to understand the
gravity of his crime, Panetti only applies this consideration to prisoners
suffering from psychotic disorders.17 5 The Court's delineation fails to
consider the culpability of criminals suffering from other disorders, such
as personality disorders. Criminals suffering from personality disorders
can also lack an acute understanding of their crimes. However, Panetti's
distinction between rational awareness and understanding does not
extend to them. Consequently, it is likely that death-row prisoners
suffering from personality disorders will challenge the Court's distinction
in future habeas proceedings using the majority's rationale from Panetti.
Additionally, critics of Panetti contend that the majority's decision will
lead to a substantial increase in the number of habeas proceedings.178
This increase will originate specifically from two points in the majority
opinion. First, the Court's interpretation of "second or successive" claims
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)'
will allow death-row inmates to file
additional habeas petitions that were previously barred. Second, the
Court's interpretation of rational understanding creates a new line of
defense for prisoners suffering from psychotic disorders. Although the
possibility of an increase in habeas claims seems reasonable, the true
impact of Panetti on the number of claims remains largely unknown.
However, it is unlikely that prisoners will be able to fake the psychotic
disorders the majority opinion considered. Because it is difficult to
impersonate a psychotic disorder, any expansion of potential defenses by
Panetti is limited to a small section of the death-row population. As a
result, the concerns of these critics appear to be unwarranted.
The Supreme Court also appears to be signaling to the State of Texas
that its capital punishment procedures are under close watch. Texas,
long known for its liberal use of the death penalty,'78 was reversed on
procedural grounds in several habeas cases during this term, including

175. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2862.
176. See Press Release, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, supra note 10.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000).
178.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT (2005), http'//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp05.pdf. During the period from

1930 to 2005, Texas led the nation in the number of executions with 652. There were a

total of 4,863 executions throughout the nation during this same period. Id. at 9.
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7 9 Brewer v. Quarterman,
5 ° and Smith
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman,"
v. Texas.'
Like Panetti, those cases also questioned the procedural
due process afforded to prisoners." 2 The Court's message to Texas
appears clear: the state must meet the minimum standards of due
process in death penalty cases even though states are traditionally
afforded wide latitude in fashioning sentencing procedures.
Furthermore, Panetti may cause other states to reexamine their
habeas procedures. In light of the majority's criticism of Texas's
procedures, states should consider whether their procedures support the
substantive purpose of a habeas proceeding. The incorporation of formal
requirements, such as the mandatory transcription of all proceedings
and mandatory evidentiary hearings for competency claims, could
safeguard states against later due process challenges. At a minimum,
the Court has provided all states with fair warning that it is concerned
with the sufficiency of their habeas proceedings.
Finally, the judicial soothsayers of capital jurisprudence believe
Panetti may represent a larger shift in the direction of affording
increased protection to capital offenders by a majority of the Supreme
Court."8 3 Although the Court is unlikely to completely revoke capital
punishment, it may attempt to limit its application by striking many of
the procedures and the techniques for administering the death penalty.
The granting of certiorari by the Court in Baze v. Rees"s furthers this
assertion. In Baze the Court will determine if the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment excludes the current methods of
administering lethal injections.8 5 This case is a continuation of the
growing trend to examine death penalty issues by the Court.s While

179. 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007). The Supreme Court remanded the case after reversing the
Fifth Circuit. Id. at 1675. The Court held that the Fifth Circuit denial of Abdul-Kabir's
claim-that the sentencing jury was improperly precluded from considering and giving
effect to mitigating evidence-was an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law. Id.
180. 127 S. Ct. 1706 (2007). The Court reversed and remanded the case after holding
the trial court's instructions articulating Texas "special issues" did not adequately provide
the jury with an opportunity to decide if relevant mitigating evidence could support a
punishment other than death. Id. at 1713-14.
181. 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007). The Court reversed and remanded the case after
determining that Smith was entitled to relief under the State's "harmless error
framework." Id. at 1699.
182. See Brewer, 127 S. Ct. 1706; Smith, 127 S. Ct. 1686;Abdul.Kabir, 127 S. Ct. 1654.
183. See, e.g., Press Release, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, supra note 10.
184. 128 S.Ct. 372 (2007).
185. Id. at 372; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 372 (No. 075439), 2007 WL 2781088 at *2-3.
186. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 185.
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the direction of the Court's capital jurisprudence remains both unknown
and uncharted, the parties in Baze will certainly study cases such as
Panetti for any favorable hints from the Court.
MICHAEL ERIC HOOPER

